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1.    INTRODUCTION
This paper sets out to assess the role of the demographic transition in the
formation of what Hein de Haas (2007, 2008, 2009) calls the Trans-Saharan-
Trans-Mediterranean (TSTM) migration system. This system is made up of
two interconnected sub-systems: the Trans-Mediterranean (TM) system links
most of Northern Africa (especially Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt) to South-
ern Europe, while the Trans-Saharan (TS) system connects Western Africa
(especially Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Mali, and Mauritania) to North-
ern Africa and also, though to a lesser extent, to Southern Europe. Northern
Africa is thus both the origin of the migration flows towards Europe, and a
transit and destination area for migrants coming from Western Africa. The
formation of the TSTM migration system was slow and complex: the TM part
came first, in the late 1960s (de Haas, 2007, 2008, 2009; Gesano et al., 2007),
followed by the TS system, which dates back to the 1980s (Bensaad, 2003,
2008; Pliez, 2000; Bredeloup and Pliez, 2011). Migration between the
Maghreb and Europe was already important in colonial times, but the increase
registered later on was such that it can be considered the start of a new phase
(de Haas, 2005:4).
The key hypothesis that we test in this paper is that the remote cause
behind the emergence of the TSTM migration system is rapid population
growth, triggered by the demographic transition. But the link between the two
phenomena (population growth and international emigration) is not direct,
and cannot be fully understood if one ignores the role of some fundamental
environmental constraints. International migration is the ultimate response of
a society to population growth, most of which takes place in rural areas. If
other safety valves are effective in alleviating population pressure (e.g., the
availability of free land, an increase in rural production, or urbanization)
international emigration may not ensue, or at least not immediately, but if it
does, it need not be as strong as in other apparently similar cases. 
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2.   POPULATION GROWTH AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: 
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Migration is not mentioned in the original formulation of the demograph-
ic transition theory (Thompson, 1929; Landry, 1934; Davis, 1943; Notestein,
1945) and studies focusing on the connections between the demographic tran-
sition and international migration are still relatively rare, though there are a
handful: see, e.g., Easterlin (1961), Davis (1963), Zelinsky (1971), Chesnais
(1992), Skeldon (1997), Hatton and Williamson (1998), Reher (2004), Clark
(2007), and de Haas (2009). 
The prevailing interpretation offered for international migration today
places relatively little emphasis on population growth in the sending countries:
economic conditions, it is claimed, matter more than demography, and popula-
tion growth is seen as a consequence of economic development (Massey, 1988;
Massey et al., 1998:11). Formerly, instead, even economists conceded that pop-
ulation growth was at the root of international migration, with a lag of some 20
to 30 years, when an increasing number of newborns, now surviving to adult-
hood, reached the typical migration ages (Easterlin, 1961).
Empirical research on this topic has yielded contradictory results, and sev-
eral papers on the macro demographic characteristics of the sending countries
conclude that neither population growth nor fertility exerts any significant
effect on international migration (e.g. Zlotnik, 2004; de Haas, 2009). Zlotnik
(2004:25), for instance, writes: “In sum, the relation between net migration and
natural increase according to the only global set of estimates available does not
seem to be strong enough to merit further exploration”.
In the same collection of essays, however, Adepoju (2004:59) argues that
population growth is one of the main determinants of African emigration, while
Malmberg (2006) using the same data as Zlotnik, but a different methodology,
claims that cohort growth has a strong predictive power on net migration. 
In the economic literature, results are at least as contradictory. Several
authors fail to identify any significant effect of population growth on interna-
tional migration (Faini and Venturini, 1994; Hatton and Williamson, 1998;
Vogler and Rotte, 2000; Clark, Hatton and Williamson, 2007; Mayda, 2010),
while others come to the opposite conclusion (Bean, Browning and Frisbie,
1990; Fertig and Schmidt, 2000; Gallina and Gesano, 2002; Mitchell and Pain,
2003; Hatton and Williamson, 2003, 2009; Hanson and McIntosh, 2010).
In part, this difference depends on the choice of the demographic variables:
the current or the lagged rate of natural increase; the proportion of the popula-
tion aged 15-24, or 20-24, or 20-29; more rarely, total fertility, or crude birth rate,
or some other ad hoc measure. On the left side of the equation, "migration"
sometimes means gross, sometimes net emigration rates, and sometimes their
logs. Table 1 tries to reduce this heterogeneity in two ways. First, and in line with
Easterlin’s hypothesis, it excludes all the papers where the current, instead of the
past, values of natural increase or fertility are used as possible determinants of
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current migration. Of the papers that we reviewed, only 15 pass this test (see
Table 1). Second, Table 1 orders the papers according to the length of the time
window covered in the analysis. All the papers listed in the table deal (sometimes
among other things) with the connection between past population growth and
current migration, and all use aggregate data. But nine of them find that past pop-
ulation growth has a significant effect on current migration, while the remain-
ing six claim that this effect is not significant. This inconsistency can be
explained in two non-alternative ways.
Table 1 – Aggregate level analyses of the effect of past population growth
on migration
Notes: (a) Significant at 5%.
The list was compiled as follows. We started with Google Scholar, with a combination of some specific keywords
(migration determinants, population growth, lagged birth rate, demographic transition, fertility transition, vital
transition, migratory transition, share of young population, Easterlin, fixed effects, within estimator, panel analy-
sis). Then we selected only the papers employing some proxy of past population growth and panel data analysis
of aggregate time series on migration. Each independent analysis carried out in each paper has been considered
as a unique entry in the table. For instance, Vogler and Rotte (2000) performed three different analyses of migra-
tion: a) From Africa to Germany; b) From Asia to Germany; c) From Africa and Asia to Germany. In our list we
included a) and b), but not c). Faini and Venturini’s (2010) paper on Italy was very similar to that of Hatton and
Williamson (1998) (same period and area; same conclusions), and has been considered redundant and excluded
from the analysis. Note that the original articles sometimes considered parameter estimates “significant” at 10%,
which is below the standard (5%) retained here.
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1) The constant-effect assumption. Most aggregate-level papers on interna-
tional migration assume that the effect of the independent variables is con-
stant across different environmental conditions and time. But is this really the
case? Empirically, in our sample, only two papers (Mitchell and Pain, 2003;
Mayda, 2010) explicitly test this hypothesis, and both reject it. Theoretically,
there are reasons to think that rural population growth can trigger different
reactions (Boserup, 1965). For instance, when free land is available, an exten-
sion of any cultivated land may constitute a valid alternative to emigration. If
land is scarce, but cities are developing quickly, there may be urbanization
without (or with little) international migration. Emigration is merely one of
the possible consequences of population growth and, in all cases; its occur-
rence and intensity depend on several other conditions (Davis, 1963).
2) The short-term bias. Working with short-time series of data creates two
problems. One is that the variability of migration rates is high, which blurs the
picture. The other is that “the migration hump” (a long historical phase, of 30
to 90 years1, during which emigration rates first increase and then decline) may
go unnoticed. “Fixed” effects are frequently introduced in the regression: these
are region-specific dummy variables, intended to capture the effects of all the
omitted, time-independent variables that influence migration: e.g. distance, cli-
mate, law provisions, etc. If the time series used in the analysis is shorter than
what is needed for the migration hump to form and vanish, the effect of popu-
lation growth may be unidirectional, and may easily be (mis)interpreted as a
fixed, country-specific effect. Of the papers listed in Table 1, for instance, only
40 per cent find a significant association between past population growth and
migration when the observation period is short (20 years or less). But this pro-
portion rises to 60 per cent when the period spans 20 to 30 years, and exceeds
80 per cent for time intervals of 30 years or more. 
Spacing also matters, probably because of random errors (“noise”),
which tend to be strong in the field of international migration: in 11 of the
papers listed in Table 1, the time lag between observations is 1 year (or less),
and only 45 per cent of these papers find a significant association between
past population growth and migration. Conversely, all the papers where
observations are spaced by 5 years or more find a significant connection
between these two phenomena.
3. INTRODUCING INTERACTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION MODELS
The theoretical framework for our analysis derives from the theory of mul-
tiphasic response (Davis, 1963). It states that populations react to the strains
produced by mortality decline and demographic increase in several ways: lim-
1 It lasted about 30 years in South Korea, and about 90 in the case of the migration from Europe
to the Americas (Massey, 2003:17).
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iting their fertility through abortion or contraception; giving rise to internal or
international migration; intensifying agricultural activity and production (e.g.
extending cultivated land), etc. These reactions, the combination of which may
vary depending on circumstances, tend to compete with each other: the stronger
and the more effective the results for one, the weaker the results for the others.
In this paper we concentrate on two types of responses to population
growth:
a) intensified agricultural output, through an increase in working hours and
an extension of cultivated land, along the lines originally suggested by Boserup
(1965);
b) more internal (rural to urban) migration, which alleviates population
pressure in rural areas (Dyson, 2010, 2011).
The rationale of the multiphasic response theory can be formalized
through a multiplicative interaction model. In order to see this more clearly, let
us first imagine a simplified, theoretical situation where only two reactions to
population increase are possible: urbanization or emigration. These, it can be
assumed, tend to compete with each other: more urbanization is associated with
less emigration. The effect of population growth on emigration is, therefore,
conditioned by the intensity of urbanization: if this is weak, emigration will be
relevant; conversely, if it is strong, emigration may be negligible. If urbaniza-
tion is ignored, the statistical relationship between past natural increase and
emigration becomes spurious, and may appear as insignificant.
A multiplicative interaction model may help solve the problem: 
[1]
where Et stands for emigration between t-1 and t, Ut stands for urbanization
(variation in the proportion of urban population), and Nt-k stands for the natural
increase between t-k-1 and t-k (that is, k years before). Equation [1] can be
rewritten as follows:
[2]
which shows that the overall marginal effects (b1 + b3U) of natural increase (N)
on emigration (E), depends on urbanization (U) and on the value of the interac-
tion coefficient b3.
Equation [1] can be extended to allow for multiple forms of interaction,
considering that, beyond urbanization, there may be other reactions to increased
population pressure: for instance more rural productivity, or an extension of cul-
tivated land (Boserup, 1965). The process may then be modeled as follows:
[3]
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where Ai are the alternative responses to population growth, of which we con-
sider four (see further in the text), and Pi are variables intended to capture polit-
ical crises, which are frequent in Sub-Saharan Africa (see below). In this model
there are four sets of independent variables (see Table 2 for the details):
- the mean value of natural increase (N), k year before, where k means 15
to 20, i.e. the time needed for a newborn to reach working age. We expect its
coefficient, b1, to be positive: a strong natural increase today leads to potential
emigration in 15 to 20 years’ time;
- the potential alternative responses (Ai) to population growth, assumed to
moderate the effects of natural growth on international migration. We consider
four such alternative responses: 1) increasing food supply per person (F); 2)
increasing arable land per person (L); 3) urban growth (U); and 4) economic
growth (Y, GDP growth per person); 
- the interactions between these responses and population growth (AiN);
- finally, in order to include the effects of the (frequent) political crises in
the region (especially in Sub-Saharan Africa) we include two more variables: the
share of refugees Ri and the share of asylum seekers Si in the total population.
4.    THE DATA
Time is important in this type of analysis because, as discussed in Section
2, the “migration hump” needs some 30 to 90 years to fully develop. Taking
lags into account, this requires the use of very long time series, which are only
rarely available. We selected the longest series that we could find and that could
be considered internationally comparable (UN, 2010). 
Net migration is the difference between natural and total population increase.
The notion of net migration has been criticized, sometimes harshly (Rogers,
1990). However, in practice, researchers continue to refer to it (Jennissen, 2003;
Hatton and Williamson, 2003; Zlotnik, 2004; Malmberg, 2006; Hanson and
McIntosh, 2010; Naudé, 2010), in part for lack of alternatives and in part because
this variable does make sense at the aggregate (if not at the individual) level. Its
main shortcoming is that it is obtained by the difference between total and natu-
ral growth, which normally amplifies measurement errors, though the use of five-
year periods (instead of single year intervals) limits this shortcoming. We changed
its sign, in order to facilitate interpretation: in this paper E measures net emigra-
tion, and a positive coefficient means “more (net) emigration”.
In order to check the reliability of these data we also considered an alter-
native source on emigration from the countries covered in this analysis. The UN
collected and, within certain limits, harmonized, data on the migration flows
towards a limited number of economically-developed countries (UN 2008). For
seven countries (Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden
2 The Spanish series starts only in 1982. Before 1982, however, immigration to Spain was negligi-
ble: we retained the data then for Spain and imputed zero immigration for the preceding years.
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and the United States) there are annual time series dating back to the 1970s,
where immigrants are classified by place of birth or nationality. On this basis,
the migration flow originating from Western and Northern Africa and heading
towards each of these seven countries is known with small margins of error.
This is not all the emigration from our region, of course, but it gives a sense of
the general trends. We call this variable G, for gross emigration. Note that when
emigration increases, both E and G increase.
Table 2 – Description of the variables employed in the model
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Our analysis covers 17 countries, in different phases of the migration tran-
sition process (and therefore also of the migration hump): 5 countries from
Southern Europe (Greece, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain), 4 from Northern
Africa (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt) and 8 from Western Africa
(Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria and
Senegal). The analysis spans over 35 years, from the 1970-1975 period to the
2000-2005 period. For each country, 7 observations are therefore available.
All the variables that we use are listed in Table 2, together with their labels
and the sources from which they derive. Illustrative values for the initial, the
final and an intermediate 5-year period are reported in Table 3. 
5.    THE EFFECT OF POPULATION GROWTH
At the beginning of the 1980s there was a relative slowdown in urbaniza-
tion in Northern and Western Africa, which, in some cases (e.g., Burkina Faso
and the Ivory Coast; see Beauchemin, 2005), led to counter urbanization, with
net emigration from the cities (Figure 1.a). There were several possible causes
for the slowdown of urbanization in Northern and Western Africa in those years,
but two main factors stand out: the general saturation of urban places produced
by the rural-urban exodus during decolonization, and the explosion of the debt
crises at the end of the 1970s, which led to substantial cuts in public spending,
traditionally benefitting cities much more than rural areas.
Table 3 – Migration, urbanization and natural increase in Northern and
Western Africa: descriptive statistics
Notes: t = initial year of the 5-year period over which rates (or average values) are calculated. E = Net
emigration rates; G = Gross emigration rate towards selected countries; N = Natural increase; U = Rate
of increase in the proportion of population living in “urban agglomerations”. All rates are per thousand
population, per 5 years.
Sources: see Table 2.
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The data from the UN Population Division shows that the slowdown of
urbanization was followed, a few years later, by an increase in emigration
(Baldwin-Edwards, 2006; Thomas, 2011) and also by a reduction in fertility
(Figure 1.c and 1.b. Figure 1.b represents our “gross migration rate” G),
although we do not explicitly consider this here (see, on this topic, Cohen and
Montgomery, 1998; Courbage, 1999; Fargues, 2000; Rashad, 2000; Eltigani,
2001; Garenne and Joseph, 2002).
Figure 1 – Standardized measures of urbanization (U), emigration (E) and




Notes: To each data point, representing the value of a particular index in a given country in a specific year,
we have subtracted the country mean and the results have been divided by the country standard deviation.
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5.1   A multiphasic response to population growth
Let us now try to model the effect of population growth on international
migration, starting with the simplest case, where only two determinants of net
emigration are considered: population growth and urbanization (Table 4,
Model 1). 
Ignoring interaction, as in Model 1, neither population growth nor urban-
ization are significant. The reason for this is that urbanization interacts with pop-
ulation growth in influencing net migration. With the introduction of the interac-
tion term (equation [2] and model 2), all the coefficients of the model become
significant and the overall predictive power of model 2 with respect to model 1
increases considerably (the ANOVA test has a p-value lower than 0.001).
The coefficient of the interaction term (U.P) is negative and significant:
this suggests that urbanization reduces the pressure of population growth on
emigration. On the basis of these regression coefficients, Figure 2 shows, for
different levels of urbanization, the part of the overall natural increase that,
some 20 years later, translates into net international migration. The effect of
population increase on net migration is null if the 5-year increase in the propor-
tion of the population living in urban agglomerations reaches 15 per cent or so;
Table 4 – Population growth effect: basic models
Notes: - All the variables of the models are rates, as previously defined. Positive values of E indicate net
emigration (same sign as G). G is gross emigration towards only a few selected countries (see text).
- N is the rate of natural increase 20 years before. In model 2, for instance, the positive value of the coef-
ficient (0.23) signals that, without urbanization (U = 0), about a quarter of the overall natural increase
transforms, 20 years later, into emigration.
-The analysis covers 17 countries over the period 1970-2004. Each observations in our dataset refers to a
five year period (1970-75, 1975-79, ..., 2000-2005). Our dataset covers therefore 119 observations (17
countries x 7 periods).
- In all three models, Breusch and Pagan’s test accepts the hypothesis of country effect, but rejects the
hypothesis of a significant period effect, and Wooldridge’s test accepts the hypothesis of significant seri-
al correlation. Therefore, we used the “within” estimator (the countries’ means have been subtracted from
the series) and then we applied OLS with robust clustered standard errors. A difference emerges with
Pesaran’s CD: for models 1 and 2, the hypothesis of a significant cross-correlation in the data is rejected,
while for model 3 it is accepted.
- Asterisks indicate significance: *< 0.05; **< 0.01; ***< 0.001.
Sources: See Table 2.
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below this threshold, past population growth fosters emigration. When the 5-
year increase in the proportion of urban population is lower than 4 per cent the
effect of past population increase on emigration becomes highly significant (at
5 per cent). The same model with a different dependent variable, G (gross emi-
gration), yields basically the same results (Table 4, model 3), which corrobo-
rates our claim that the model is robust, and that the interaction factor is worth
considering.
Let us now move on and introduce other variables and other interactions:
F (Food), L (Land) and Y (Income) – all of them measuring increases in per
person values, as explained in Table 2. Without interactions (Table 5, model
4) none of the coefficients is significant, as in model 1. With interactions,
however, most of the coefficients become significant (model 5). Before turn-
ing to their interpretation, which presents several difficulties, let us first note
that the inclusion of the interaction terms significantly improves the fit (or,
better, the likelihood) of the model (p-value < 0.001). Moreover, the coeffi-
cients of three of the interaction terms (natural increase with food per person,
land per person and urban population) are significant and with the expected
sign, which reinforces our conjecture that these variables mitigate the effect
of population increase on international migration.
As for the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, the effect of natural
Figure 2 – Marginal effect of population growth for
different urbanization values
GIAMBATTISTA SALINARI - GUSTAVO DE SANTIS
72
population growth on net emigration is positive (i.e., population growth encour-
ages emigration) and slightly significant (at 10 per cent). In order to interpret this
result correctly, it should be remembered that the coefficient here indicates the
conditional effect of population growth on migration when all the other variables
(including interactions) are zero. In other words: when the per person growth in
food and land fully compensates population growth and there is no urbanization,
one sixth of natural population growth will, with a lag of 20 years, be trans-
formed into out-migration. This is consistent with our theoretical framework:
when alternative responses fully compensate for the effect of population
increase, emigration is weak.
Table 5 – Population growth effect: extended models
Notes: - All the variables of the models are rates, as previously defined. Positive values of E indicate net
emigration (same sign as G). G is gross emigration towards only a few selected countries (see text).
- N is the rate of natural increase 20 years before. In model 5, for instance, the positive value of the coef-
ficient (0.15) signals that, when all other variables are set to 0 (U = F = Y = L = 0), about 15 per cent of
the overall natural increase transforms, 20 years later, into emigration.
- The analysis covers 17 countries over the period 1970-2004. Each observations in our dataset refers to
a five year period (1970-75, 1975-79, …, 2000-2005). Our dataset covers therefore 119 observations (17
countries x 7 periods).
- In models 1 and 3 Breusch and Pagan’s test accepts the hypothesis of country effect, but rejects the
hypothesis of a significant period effect. Wooldridge’s test accept the hypothesis of significant serial cor-
relation. Pesaran’s CD test rejects the hypothesis of a significant cross-correlation in the data. The coef-
ficients were estimated with the within estimator (the countries’ means have been subtracted from the
series) and OLS has been applied with robust clustered standard errors.
- In models 2 Breusch and Pagan’s test accepts the hypothesis of country effect, but rejects the hypothe-
sis of a significant period effect. Wooldridge’s test rejects the hypothesis of significant serial correlation.
Pesaran’s CD test rejects the hypothesis of a significant cross-correlation in the data. For this reason we
used the within estimator (the countries’ means have been subtracted to the series) and then we applied
OLS with robust clustered standard errors. The coefficients were estimated with the within estimator and
OLS applied with robust clustered standard errors.
- Asterisks indicate different degrees of significance: 
.
< 0.1; *< 0.05; **< 0.01; ***< 0.001.
Sources: See Table 2.
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Model 53 can also be used to test the effect of population increase on migra-
tion when some or all of the concurrent responses do not compensate for popu-
lation growth, or, at least, when they fail to do so in full. The difficulty here is
that the effect of population growth on emigration can be significantly affected
by three different phenomena: per person land increase, per person food supply
increase and urbanization. Figure 3 can help visualize how this multi-dimension-
al interaction process works. Its two panels show the marginal effect of popula-
tion growth on international migration for different values of arable land growth,
food supply growth and urbanization. In each panel, the oblique plane indicates
the (average, model) effect of population growth on international migration for
a given value of urbanization. Colors are darker when the points on the plane are
significant at a 5 per cent or at a 1 per cent threshold. In order to facilitate the
reading of the graphs we also projected, on the floor of each graph, in different
shades of grey, the degree of the significance of the estimated coefficients.
Three main conclusions emerge from Figure 3:
a) without a significant reduction in (per person) land and food availabil-
ity, population growth produces only a weak effect on international emigration;
Figure 3 – Marginal effects of population growth on international migration
under different scenarios 
Notes: The two panels show the effect of population growth on international migration for different val-
ues of arable land growth (L), food supply growth (F) and urbanization (U). In each panel, the oblique
plane indicates the estimated effect of population growth on international migration for a given value of
urbanization (model 5). Darker shadings highlights the points on the plane significant at a 5 per cent or 1
per cent threshold. These shadings are also projected on the floor of each graph, in different grey scales,
with the same meaning.
3 Model 6 uses G (gross migration rate) instead of E (net migration rate) as a dependent variable.
The results are basically the same (although the coefficients turn out to be somewhat less signif-
icant) and we will, therefore, not comment on them here.
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b) even in cases where there is a significant reduction in land and food
availability, urbanization may counter international migration by absorbing the
bulk of rural exodus;
c) only when all these alternative responses to population growth fail,
does international migration ensue.
Figure 4 compares the actual (net) emigration rates with those predicted by
model 5: the two series are in general very similar (except for occasional devi-
ations: e.g. Ghana, around 1975) and the trend is always the same.
5.2.   The short-term bias
In section 2 we argued that contradictory results in the literature about the
effect of past population growth on international migration may depend, in part,
on what we called the short-term bias. In order to avoid this, the present paper
includes countries in different phases of their demographic (and emigration)
transition, and uses the longest available time series on international migration.
Figure 4 – Actual and predicted values of net migration rate
(1970 to 2005, 17 countries)
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Let us test to what extent these strategies influence the results of our analysis.
Model 5 (in Table 5) can be run on several sub-samples of our dataset.
Using only Northern and Western African countries, and excluding Southern
Europe, leads to model 7, where the parameters have the same signs as those of
model 5, but with lower significance, and where the overall fit of the model is
worse. Models 8 and 9, instead, refer to shorter periods: model 8 covers only 25
years (from 1980 to 2005), and model 9 covers only 15 years (from 1990 to
2005), whereas our preferred model (model 5) spans 35 years, from 1970 to
2005. Model 8 (25 years) suffers from only a slight reduction in the explained
variance (the adjusted R2 drops to 0.33), and the signs and the significance of
the coefficients are not affected much. Conversely, with model 9 (15 years)
major effects on the estimated coefficients emerge: the explained variance
declines considerably (Adjusted R2 = 0.25), and almost all the coefficients lose
their significance, even if they preserve their sign. Short-term political shocks
(as measured by refugees and asylum seekers) occasionally seem to play a role.
Table 6 – Testing the population growth effects on shorter time series
(short-term bias)
Notes: - All the variables of the models are rates, as previously defined. Positive values of E indicate net
emigration (same sign as G). 
- N is the rate of natural increase 20 years before. In model 7, for instance, the positive value of the coef-
ficient (0.12) signals that, when all other variables are set to 0 (U = F = Y = L = 0), about 12 per cent of
the overall natural increase transforms, 20 years later, into emigration.
- Model 7 covers 12 countries during the period 1970-2005 (84 observations); Model 8 covers 17 coun-
tries during the period 1980-2005 (85 observations); Model 9 covers 17 countries during the period 1990-
2005 (51 observations).
- Asterisks indicate different degrees of significance: 
.
< 0.1; *< 0.05; **< 0.01; ***< 0.001.
Sources: See Table 2.
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In short, two main conclusions emerge. The first is that our model appears
to be rather robust, because none of the alternative limitations introduced in our
dataset significantly change the signs of the coefficients. Second, the short-term
bias emerges as a serious problem only when the temporal extension of the
analysis falls below 20 years, which is consistent with our tentative systemati-
zation of the surveyed literature (Table 1).
6. RESULTS
Population growth began in Northern and Western Africa long ago: prob-
ably sometime in the 1920s through to the 1950s. Mass emigration started
much later: in the 1980s. The time lag between the two processes is substan-
tial. But, on the other hand, it is hard to believe that population growth, fre-
quently more than 30 per thousand, had no effect on the emergence of the
Trans-Saharan and the Trans-Mediterranean migration systems, as certain
analyses suggest.
The apparent paradox can be solved if one assumes that the timing of the
migration transition is also influenced by specific environmental and histori-
cal conditions, among which the availability of arable land, the increase in
rural productivity or urbanization. These “safety valves” may offer alterna-
tives to international emigration in case of rapid population growth, as Davis
conjectured back in 1963. His “multiphasic” theory can be formalized and it
works satisfactorily if interactions between each of these alternatives and
population growth are explicitly introduced. All of the interaction terms esti-
mated in this paper are highly significant, which strengthens our claim that
these safety valves (urbanization, expansion of arable land, etc.) were at work
in Northern and Western Africa between 1950 and 1980. Population growth
resulted in strong international emigration flows only subsequently, when
these safety valves ceased to work.
This paper does not, and cannot, provide conclusive evidence on the
matter, in part because of data limitation. For instance, the “demographic
push” that we suggest constitutes the ultimate source of international emigra-
tion is only imperfectly measured by the past rate of population growth - but
no alternative is fully convincing (e.g. the share of population of working age
depends on recent emigration, and introduces and endogeneity problem),
especially considering that we need a long and comparable time series of data.
Internal migration is surely a complex process, and the rate of urbanization
that we use here is but a pale proxy for it. We do not take into consideration
the educational level or the (potential) wage of migrants, and therefore
implicitly assume that they are all equal - which is surely not the case.
Unfortunately, until major breakthroughs materialize in data availability,
most of the subtler curiosities that one may have about the causes of interna-
tional migration flows are likely to remain unanswered. But the available evi-
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dence that this paper has collected and elaborated offers, we believe, a con-
sistent (and, all in all, highly expected) conclusion overall: population pres-
sure creates problems. When cheaper solutions are available (e.g. more land
to cultivate, or internal migration, e.g. to towns), populations resort to them.
When this is not the case, international emigration ensues.
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